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I.

INTRODUCTION: A DISPUTE OVER WETLANDS LED TO
SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS IN NORTH DAKOTA

During the 1970s and 1980s, a dispute emerged between the State of
North Dakota and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).1

*J.D., 1990, University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand Forks, North Dakota; B.S.
Accounting, 1987, Minnesota State University, Mankato, Minnesota. Jon J. Jensen practices in
Grand Forks, North Dakota with a focus on tax controversy and litigation. The author would like
to thank Linda E. Bata, J.D., for keeping him on task regardless of how far he would stray from
the topic at hand.
1. See Murray G. Sagsveen & Matthew A. Sagsveen, Waterfowl Production Areas: An
Updated State Prospective, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 861, 861 n.1 (2000). See generally Murray G.
Sagsveen, Waterfowl Production Areas: A State Prospective, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 659 (1984).
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Beginning in 1958, the FWS aggressively pursued the purchase of waterfowl protection area easements in North Dakota.2 That practice by the FWS
led to the purchase of easements covering over one million acres of
property in North Dakota.3
To understand why 1958 was a dramatic turning point, it is necessary
to briefly review the history of the acquisition of waterfowl production area
easements by the FWS. In 1929, Congress enacted the 1929 Migratory
Bird Conservation Act, which provided authorization for the acquisition of
migratory bird sanctuaries.4 However, acquisition of migratory bird
sanctuaries was authorized only if a state consented “by law.”5 In 1931, the
State of North Dakota provided the required consent under the 1929 Act.6
Funding for the purchase of migratory bird sanctuaries was provided by
the 1934 Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act.7 The 1934 Act generated
revenue for the purchase of migratory bird sanctuaries through the sale of
migratory bird hunting and conservation stamps.8 Congress amended the
1934 Act in 1958 to allow for the acquisition of land for waterfowl
production areas.9 The amendment also allowed the FWS to acquire waterfowl production areas without obtaining the state consent required under the
1929 Act.10 In the absence of a requirement to obtain state legislative
consent, acquisition of property for waterfowl production areas was
accelerated.
As the number of acres under the protection of waterfowl production
easements grew, disputes between landowners and the federal government
increased.11 Landowners typically sought to drain the wetlands primarily
for agricultural purposes.12 The FWS, however, typically opposed any
draining of the wetlands.13 For example, in 1983, the United States sought
a declaratory judgment to invalidate a North Dakota law that restricted the
2. Sagsveen & Sagsveen, supra note 1, at 862 n.3.
3. Id.
4. Sagsveen, supra note 1, at 659 (citing Pub. L. No. 70-770, 45 Stat. 1222 (1929)).
5. Id. at 660.
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 73-124, 48 Stat. 451 (1934)).
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 85-585, § 3, 72 Stat. 486, 487)).
10. Id.
11. See Sagsveen & Sagsveen, supra note 1, at 862.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 462 (8th Cir. 1996). In Johansen, two
brothers were charged with violating the terms of their easement agreements with the FWS. Id. at
460-61. North Dakota had experienced two consecutive wet years, and the Johansens had
contacted the FWS seeking permission to drain portions of their farmland. Id. at 462. After
failing to obtain permission, the Johansens proceeded with unauthorized draining of wetlands and
were charged with a violation of 16 U.S.C. § 668dd. Id.
13. Id.
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ability of the United States to acquire wetland easements.14 The North
Dakota law required the Governor to submit proposed wetland acquisitions
to the Board of County Commissioners where the underlying land was
located.15 The United States Supreme Court determined the consent of a
prior Governor could not be revoked by the incumbent Governor and the
North Dakota Legislature could not add restrictions to the consent.16
In response to the loss of productive farmland, the North Dakota
Legislature enacted section 47-05-02.1(2) of the North Dakota Century
Code.17 Section 47-05-02.1 includes provisions intended to limit the
duration of real property easements.18 As a result, included within section
47-05-02.1 is the following restriction on the duration of easements in
North Dakota: “[t]he duration of the easement, servitude, or nonappurtenant restriction on the use of real property must be specifically set out, and in
no case may the duration of any interest in real property regulated by this
section exceed ninety-nine years.”19 Section 47-05-02.1(2) and its limitation on the duration of easements was intended to facilitate the continued
use of agricultural property in North Dakota for productive purposes.
While the intent of the statute was the protection of North Dakota
landowners, the statute is now being used as a tool by the Internal Revenue
Service to disallow charitable contributions based on the gift of conserveation easements. More specifically, the Internal Revenue Service has taken
the position that conservation easements in North Dakota cannot qualify as
charitable deductions as a matter of law because qualification for charitable
deduction would require the easement to be “perpetual” and section 47-0502.1(2) prohibits easements from exceeding ninety-nine years.20 This
14. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309 (1983). The Migratory Bird Hunting
Stamp Act had provided authorization to the Secretary of the Interior to acquire migratory
waterfowl breeding and nesting grounds. Id. at 302-03. The Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act
also included a provision that the Governor or appropriate state agency provide approval for the
acquisition. Id. at 303.
15. Id. at 306-07.
16. Id. at 321.
17. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1 (1999). The prefatory text of the section includes a
notation that the statute becomes binding on easements, servitudes, and any nonappurtenant
restrictions on the use of real property which become binding after July 1, 1977. Id.
18. Id. § 47-05-02.1(2).
19. Id.
20. See Petition at 2, Wachter v. Comm’r, No. 9213-11 (T.C. Apr. 15, 2011). In Wachter,
the taxpayer, through a partnership, provided a contribution of a conservation easement to a
qualified organization. Id. at 3-6. The deed conveying the easement clearly provided that the
easement was granted “in perpetuity.” The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that
North Dakota Century Code section 47-05-02.1 and its restriction of easements to a life of ninetynine years is in direct conflict with “in perpetuity” requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 170. See id. at 2
(alleging the Commissioner erroneously disallowed charitable contributions based on its
interpretation of the law).
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article will address the tension between the state and federal laws and how
conservation easements can, in fact, qualify as a charitable deduction.
II. THE BASICS OF QUALIFYING FOR A CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTION FOR THE GIFT OF A QUALIFIED
CONSERVATION EASEMENT
The first legislation providing individuals an income tax deduction for
charitable contributions was enacted in 1917.21 Under the current version
of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170 generally governs charitable
contribution deductions.22
However, § 170 and the accompanying
regulations reference several other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
for the purpose of determining the deductibility of any particular contribution.23 The authority for the deduction of charitable contributions for
qualified conservations easements is found in § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), which
allows a deduction for any “qualified conservation contribution.”24 The
following subsections will provide general background related to charitable
contributions and more specific information on qualified conservation
contributions.
A. OVERVIEW OF DEDUCTIBLE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
For federal tax purposes, charitable contributions are governed by 26
U.S.C. § 170.25 Charitable contributions are deductible as an itemized
deduction on Schedule A of an individual’s Form 1040.26 In order to
qualify as a deductible charitable contribution, the following conditions
21. See Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). The original
charitable contribution deduction allowed taxpayers to deduct up to fifteen percent of their taxable
net income. Id. The deductions were limited to individual taxpayers and required the contributions to be made to organizations operated “exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of
the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual . . . .” Id.
Corporations were provided with a charitable contribution deduction in 1936. Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, § 23(q), 49 Stat. 1648, 1661 (1936). The Revenue Act of 1936 allowed corporations to deduct up to five percent of their net income for gifts made to specific organizations. Id.
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006).
23. See generally id. For example, in determining whether individual taxpayers may deduct
charitable contributions made by a partnership, it is necessary to review § 702(a)(4) which
provides the rules for allocation of distributive shares of charitable contributions to each partner.
Id. § 702(a)(4).
24. Id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). See infra Part II.B for a discussion of how the term qualified
conservation easement is defined in § 170(h) and Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-14.
25. See 26 U.S.C. § 170.
26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 526: CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS 2, 20 (Jan. 27, 2011); cf. Boyd v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 440, 443 (2003)
(holding charitable contributions not allowed under § 170 on Schedule A can still be deducted as a
business expense if legitimately made for business purposes).
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must be satisfied. First, the contribution must be to a qualified charitable
organization.27 Second, the contribution is deductible during the tax year in
which the contribution is made to the qualified charitable organization.28
Additionally, charitable contributions are subject to statutory ceilings for
individuals.29 Finally, the charitable contribution must meet certain substantiation requirements.30
27. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c). Section 170(c) provides five broad types of organizations that
qualify for as charitable organizations including the following: (1) states and their political
subdivisions, United States possessions and their political subdivisions, the United States, or the
District of Columbia, but only if the contribution is made exclusively for public purposes as
provided in § 170(c)(1); (2) a charitable corporation, trust, or community organization meeting the
requirements of § 170(c)(2); (3) veterans organizations meeting the requirements of § 170(c)(3);
(4) fraternal organizations provided that the contributions are used exclusively for the purposes
outlined in § 170(c)(4); and (5) cemetery organizations as defined in § 170(c)(5). Id.
28. Id. § 170(a). Even this requirement, which seems simple on its face, is subject to
significant regulation. For example, determination of when a contribution made by check is paid,
and therefore deductible, is governed by Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1(b).
29. Id. § 170(b). Limitations on the amount of the charitable contribution deduction for
individuals are defined as a percentage of the individual’s “contribution base.” Id. § 170(b)(1).
“Contribution base” is defined as an individual’s adjusted gross income for the year, excluding
any net operating loss carryback for that year. Id. Charitable contributions are limited to either
fifty percent or thirty percent of the individual’s contribution base depending upon whether the
contributions were made to “50% charities” or “30% charities,” respectively. Id. § 170(b)(1).
Some of the more common “50% charities” include churches, tax-exempt educational
organizations, tax-exempt hospitals, political subdivisions, and traditional charitable organizations, which are operated exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, scientific, or literary
purposes. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). “30% charities” are defined as any charitable organization that is
not a “50% charity.” Id. § 170(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(c) (2011). The Internal Revenue
Code also provides a method for determining an individual’s contribution limitation if the
individual has a mix of thirty percent and fifty percent charitable contribution. See 26 U.S.C. §
170(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-8(c). Special rules also apply to the contribution of
appreciated capital gain property. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(C). For qualified conservation easements made after 2005 and before 2012, an individual is allowed to deduct qualified conservation
easement contributions to the extent the total qualified easement contributions do not exceed fifty
percent of the individual’s contribution base over the amount of all other charitable contributions.
Id. § 170(b)(1)(E). Under certain circumstances, qualified conservation contributions that are
made by qualified farmers or ranchers are eligible to deduct 100% of the contribution base less all
other charitable contributions. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv).
30. Id. § 170(a)(1). Section 170(a)(1) provides that charitable contributions are only
deductible if the contribution is verified under the regulations prescribed by the Treasury
Secretary. Id. The contribution is also required to meet the substantiation requirements of §
155(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. 98-369, § 155, 98 Stat. 494, 691-95 (1984).
The substantiation requirements prescribed by the Treasury Secretary are generally found within
Treasury Regulation section 170A-13. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
PUBLICATION 1771: CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: SUBSTANTIATION AND DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS 1-13 (2011); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 26, at 18-20.
Because deductions are provided to taxpayers purely as a matter of legislative grace, taxpayers
must carry the burden of proving that the taxpayer is entitled to the claimed deduction.
INDOPCO Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Halvering, 292 U.S.
435, 440 (1934). The specific substantiation Treasury regulations require the taxpayer to
complete the following: (1) obtain a qualified appraisal as defined in § 1.170A-13(c)(3); (2)
attach to the taxpayer’s return a completed appraisal summary as defined by § 1.170A-13(c)(4);
and (3) maintain all of the records required by § 1.170A-13(b)(2)(ii). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A13(c)(2). The substantiation requirements become progressively more detailed depending upon
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In resolving disputes with the Internal Revenue Service concerning the
deductibility of a charitable contribution, a taxpayer bears the initial burden
of establishing the entitlement to the deduction.31 Individuals who fail to
establish they are entitled to the charitable contribution deduction may be
subject to penalties for underpayment of income tax.32
B. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR QUALIFIED CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS
The Internal Revenue Code generally prohibits partial interests from
being used as the basis for a charitable contribution deduction unless the
partial interest qualifies as a specific exception.33 One of the partial interest
exceptions is a “qualified conservation contribution,”34 or easement. To
satisfy the definition of a “qualified conservation contribution,” the contribution must meet the following requirements. First, the contributed property
must be a “qualified real property interest.”35 Second, the property must be

the amount of the gift and the type of property donated. A complete discussion of the substantiation requirements for charitable contributions is beyond the scope of this article.
31. Anonymous v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 6 (2010) (citing INDOPCO Inc., 503 U.S.
at 84; New Colonial Ice Co., 292 U.S. at 440).
32. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6662. Section 6662 provides negligence, substantial
understatement, and overvaluation penalties, while § 6663 provides for fraud penalties. Id. §§
6662-63. Penalty provisions have been expanded to penalize appraisers when their appraisal
results in a substantial misstatement of valuation. Id. § 6662A. The government is required to
establish the appropriateness of an applicable penalty by providing evidence that all of the
elements for one or more of the penalties have been satisfied. Id. § 7491(c); Higbee v. Comm’r,
116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). An individual may avoid the imposition of the penalty by establishing
one of the recognized defenses such as reasonable cause, good faith, adequate disclosure, or
substantial authority. Higbee, 116 T.C. at 446-47.
33. 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3). Section 170(f)(3)(A) reads as follows:
In the case of a contribution (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest in property
which consists of less than the taxpayer’s entire interest in such property, a deduction
shall be allowed under this section only to the extent that the value of the interest
contributed would be allowable as a deduction under this section if such interest had
been transferred in trust. For purposes of this subparagraph, a contribution by a
taxpayer of the right to use property shall be treated as a contribution of less than the
taxpayer’s entire interest in such property.
Id. § 170(f)(3)(A).
34. Id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii).
35. Id. § 170(h)(1)(A). Qualified real property interests include the entire interest of the
owner other than a qualified mineral interest, a remainder interest, and a perpetual conservation
restriction. Id. § 170(h)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b). Entire interests in real property consist
of any undivided interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(1)(ii). When providing a contribution of
an entire interest in real property, the individual is allowed to retain an interest in, and the right to
access, subsurface oil, gas, or minerals. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(1)(i).
Remainder interests include the transfer of remainder interests following the expiration of life
estates or a period of years. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(B). Perpetual conservation restrictions, the
subject of this article, include restrictions on the use of real property in perpetuity. Id. §
170(h)(2)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2). Conservation restrictions may take the form of
easements, restrictive covenants, or equitable servitudes. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2).
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received by a “qualified organization.”36 Lastly, the contribution must be
used “exclusively for conservation purposes.”37
In order for the contribution to qualify as being used exclusively for a
conservation purpose, the contribution must be “protected in perpetuity.”38
While the Internal Revenue Code allows for some limited retained interests,
the retained interests must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions.39
However, a charitable contribution will not be disallowed if the interest
transferred is subject to future termination as the result of a remote future
event.40
III. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 47-05-02.1
SHOULD NOT PREVENT EASEMENTS FROM SATISFYING

36. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(B). The Internal Revenue Code limits the receiving organizations
to governmental subdivisions and public charities and can be placed into one of the following four
classifications: a governmental subdivision as defined by § 170(b)(1)(A)(v); a publicly supported
charitable organization as defined by § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); a publicly supported organization as
defined by § 509(a)(2); or a support organization as defined by § 509(c)(3) that is controlled by
either a publicly supported charitable organization or a governmental subdivision. Id. §
170(b)(1)(A). The qualified organization must have a commitment to conservation. Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14(c)(1). The requirement to demonstrate a commitment to conservation can be established if the organization is organized for a conservation purpose as defined in § 170(h)(4)(A).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1). The organization that receives the contribution must have the
ability and resources to enforce the restrictions on the contribution. Id. The recipient of the
contribution is prohibited from transferring the contribution unless the original conservation
restrictions are continued and the subsequent recipient is a qualified organization. Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14(c)(2). A qualified organization may dispose of a contribution if the conservation
purpose becomes impossible or impractical, provided that the proceeds from the disposition are
used consist with the original conservation purpose. Id.
37. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C). Conservation purposes include the following: preservation of
land for public recreation or education; protection of natural habitat; preservation of scenic space
provided that the governmental subdivision has a clear conservation policy and there will be
significant public benefit; and preservation of historic land or structures. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i)(iv); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1)(i)-(iv), (2)-(5). The exclusivity requirement allows only
incidental use outside the scope of the conservation purpose. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C); Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (Supp. 2010) (“A contribution shall not be treated as
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in
perpetuity.”).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). To be a legally enforceable restriction, the deed must
be recorded if recording is a prerequisite to enforcing the restriction. Id. The enforceability of the
restrictions must also extend “in perpetuity.” See Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. United States, 38
Fed. Cl. 645, 660 (1997) (finding the donor retained mineral interests but the contribution did not
qualify as a charitable conservation easement donation because the only restriction that would
prevent surface mining was a state regulator ban that lasted for only twenty years). Furthermore,
if a present use of the property is retained, that use disqualifies the contribution as a contribution
of a qualified conservation easement if the use in any way diminishes the conservation purpose.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3). For example, a state statute requiring an easement to be
rerecorded every thirty years in order to remain enforceable does not disqualify a contribution
from qualified conservation easement treatment. Id. The burden of demonstrating that a future
event is “remote” falls on the taxpayer. See Satullo v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697 (1993).
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THE REQUIREMENTS OF A QUALIFIED CONSERVATION
EASEMENT
As discussed above, a qualified conservation easement must be
exclusively for a conservation purpose.41 The exclusivity can only be
satisfied if the easement is granted “in perpetuity.”42 However, North
Dakota Century Code section 47-05-02.1 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he
duration of the easement, servitude, or nonappurtenant restriction on the use
of real property must be specifically set out, and in no case may the
duration of any interest in real property regulated by this section exceed
ninety-nine years.”43 Section 47-05-02.1 applies to any easement that
comes into existence in North Dakota after July 1, 1977.44
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that
section 47-05-02.1 precludes any easement in North Dakota from satisfying
the “in perpetuity” requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C).45 The Internal
Revenue Service has extended its position to circumstances under which a
contribution has been made to a qualified organization through the use of a
deed which expressly provides the easement is intended to extend “in
perpetuity.”46
North Dakota’s limitation on the life of a conservation easement
appears to be unique.47 “With the exception of North Dakota . . . no state
has created a legal context that precludes the conveyance of a conservation
easement eligible for federal tax benefits.”48 Ironically, though, there are
many states which impose a minimum number of years in order to qualify
as a conservation easement.49 A few states do offer restrictions on conserveation easements similar to the restriction imposed in North Dakota, but

41. See discussion supra Part II.B.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(a).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02.1(2) (1999).
44. Id. § 47-05-02.1.
45. See Petition, supra note 20, at 2 (alleging the Commissioner erroneously disallowed a
charitable contribution based on its interpretation of the law).
46. See id.
47. See C. Timothy Lindstrom, State Tax Incentives for Conservation Easements Can Benefit
Everyone, J. Multistate Tax’n & Incentives, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 20, 23.
48. Id. The author also observes that North Dakota law appears to be in direct conflict with
the “in perpetuity” requirement of federal tax law. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
49. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.2(b) (Deering 2005) (requiring conservation easements
to be perpetual); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(2) (West Supp. 2012) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. §
198-2(b) (1996) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (2011) (requiring conservation easements
to be for no less than fifteen years); W. VA. CODE § 20-12-4(c) (2009) (requiring conservation
easements to extend at least for twenty-five years).
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those states also provide methods for extending the easement in
perpetuity.50
It is the author’s belief that North Dakota’s ninety-nine year limitation
on the life of a conservation easement does not prevent North Dakota
conservation easements from being considered qualified conservation
easements for federal tax purposes. The limitation should be considered the
equivalent of a remote future event or determined to be the retention of a
negligible interest because the present value of the remainder interest
ninety-nine years into the future is essentially valueless. The Treasury’s
regulations provide specific exceptions for remote future events and
incidental use.51
The Internal Revenue Code requires gifts of charitable contributions to
be an undivided portion of the donor’s entire interest in the property, and
the retention of substantial rights precludes treatment as a gift and/or
charitable contribution.52 The test often used to determine whether the
retained interest is negligible is whether the interest is so insubstantial that
the donor has, in substance, transferred the entire interest.53 As noted by the
United States Tax Court in Stark v. Commissioner,54
[w]here the interest retained by the taxpayer is so insubstantial that
he has, in substance, transferred his entire interest in the property,
the tax treatment should so reflect. Such a taxpayer satisfies the

50. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811 (2005). In Kansas, a conservation easement is
limited to the lifetime of the grantor and may be revoked at the grantor’s request. Id. § 583811(d). However, unlike North Dakota, Kansas provides this limitation may be overcome by an
express statement within the recording instrument. Id. In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service
has taken the position in North Dakota that even an express statement that the easement has been
granted “in perpetuity” is insufficient to overcome the limitation of section 47-05-02.1. See supra
text accompanying notes 45-46.
In Alabama, conservation easements are limited to a period of thirty years or the life of the
grantor. ALA. CODE § 35-18-2(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). The easement can also be terminated
upon the sale of the property. Id. However, like in Kansas, a conservation easement can be
extended “in perpetuity” with an express statement within the deed. Id.
West Virginia provides a slightly different limitation. See W. VA. CODE § 20-12-04. In West
Virginia, a conservation easement does not extinguish an existing right to use of the property
unless the owner of the right consents at the time the easement is created. Id. § 20-12-04(d). For
example, an existing mineral lease which would allow for the surface extraction of minerals (a
violation of the exclusivity requirement) would require the owner of the lease to consent at the
time the conservation easement is terminated. See id. Again, this limitation could easily be
overcome by obtaining consent from the owner of the right at the time the conservation easement
is created. See id.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1) (2011) (discussing incidental benefit); id. § 1.170A14(g)(3) (discussing remote future event).
52. TREAS. REG. § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i).
53. See Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 252 (1986) (holding the retention of a mineral interest
was not substantial and did not preclude the charitable contribution).
54. 86 T.C. 243 (1986).
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original congressional purpose behind section 170(f)(3), and under
section 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i), Income Tax Regs., a minor deviation
from a literal application of the statute is appropriate.55
The Internal Revenue Code also provides that deduction will not be
disallowed merely because of a remote future event which may defeat the
property interest that has been passed to the donee organization.56 Treasury
Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(3) provides that a charitable deduction
will not be disallowed
merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the
donee organization may be defeated by the performance of some
act or the happening of some event, if on the date of the gift it
appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so
remote as to be negligible.57
The Treasury Regulations further provide the specific example of a
state’s statutory requirement that use restrictions must be recorded every
thirty years to remain enforceable does not render an easement nonperpetual.58 The remoteness exception is defined as “so highly improbable
that it might be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious
business transaction.”59
Additionally, the Treasury Regulations provide an incidental or insubstantial exception to the requirement that the property be used exclusively
for conservation purposes.60 The test to determine whether the exception
applies is the same as the test provided for retained interests, which asks
whether the use is substantial.61 The following example illustrates how the
North Dakota limitation creates a both remote future event and incidental
use:
55. Stark, 86 T.C. at 252.
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Briggs v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 646, 656 (1979), aff’g 665 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981)
(construing language under Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2(b) of the estate tax regulations,
which is similar to the language found in Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(3)). Factors
which have been considered in evaluating remoteness include whether the donee and the donor
intend to cause the event to occur, whether the event has occurred in the past, the extent to which
the occurrence of the event would defeat the donation, and whether the donor has control over the
event’s occurrence. See id. at 656-57.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1). The regulation provides that a deduction will not be
denied on the basis that it violates the exclusivity requirement when incidental benefit inures to
the benefit of the donor. Id.
61. See Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 252 (1986) (holding the retention of mineral rights
did not disqualify the transfer from being treated as a qualified conservation easement); Rev. Rul.
76-331, 1976-2 C.B. 52 (explaining retention of limited mineral rights is insubstantial); see also
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-29-024 (July 18, 1997).
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Taxpayer A donates an easement to Greentree Conservation that in
every aspect meets the requirements of a qualified conservation
easement with the exception of the ninety-nine year limitation
imposed by North Dakota law. The easement itself has a present
value of $500,000. Under these circumstances, the value of the
remainder interest is close to zero.
There is no direct case law discussing a ninety-nine year limitation and
whether or not it would comply with the requirements of 26 U.S.C. §
170(h)(2)(c). However, in 1973, the United States Court of Claims did
discuss perpetual easements. In Chevron Oil Co. v. United States,62 the
court noted a nine hundred ninety-nine year lease would be the equivalent
to perpetual.63 Additionally, the Chevron Court noted a ninety-nine year
lease renewable forever would also satisfy the definition of perpetual.64
Consistent with the Chevron decision, the Treasury Regulations now allow
an incidental exception to the requirement that the easement be used
exclusively for conservation purposes. Therefore, the donor’s remainder
interest at the end of a ninety-nine year term as imposed by North Dakota
law should also be considered incidental.
The present value of the remainder interest, even if the lease is limited
to ninety-nine years, is effectively zero. As discussed above, 26 U.S.C. §
170 includes an exception for circumstances that are so remote as to be
negligible.65 Similarly, Treasury Regulation section 1.170A-1(e) provides
that a conditional gift is still effective if the condition that would negate the
gift “is so remote as to be negligible.”66 Similar logic applies to the requirement that the easement be perpetual. Because a ninety-nine year easement
leaves virtually no remainder interest, the ninety-nine year limitation also
can be classified as having a negligible result.
The exception relating to an event that is so remote as to be negligible
could be interpreted as relating only to the probability of an event

62. 471 F.2d 1373 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
63. Chevron Oil Co., 471 F.2d at 1378.
64. Id.
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) (2011). The regulation provides as follows:
A deduction shall not be disallowed under section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) and this section
merely because the interest which passes to, or is vested in, the donee organization
may be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event, if on
the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event will occur is so
remote as to be negligible. See paragraph (e) of § 1.170A-1. For example, a state’s
statutory requirement that use restrictions must be rerecorded every [thirty] years to
remain enforceable shall not, by itself, render an easement nonperpetual.
Id.
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occurring.67 However, interpreting the regulations as a whole leads to the
conclusion that the remainder interest must be negligible. When considered
with the exception for incidental use, the regulations should be interpreted
to include situations in which the donor has a negligible retained interest.
In the event that North Dakota Century Code section 47-05-02.1(2) is
determined to disqualify North Dakota conservation easements from
satisfying the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 170, the North Dakota
Legislature should consider the amendment of section 47-05-02.1(2). The
most straightforward legislative amendment would be to eliminate the
prohibition against easements extending for more than ninety-nine years.
The amendment could be specifically tailored to apply only to specific
conservation easements.
An alternative to a complete exemption of conservation easements
from the ninety-nine year limitation of section 47-05-02.1 would be the
adoption of statutory provisions similar to Kansas and Alabama.68 Kansas
limits conservation easements to the lifetime of the grantor and allows
conservation easements to be revoked at the grantor’s request.69 However,
Kansas allows the restriction to be overcome by an express statement within
the reporting instrument.70 Similarly, Alabama limits conservation easements to a period of thirty years or the life of the grantor.71 However, those
restrictions can be overcome by an express statement in the recording
documents that the easement is intended to extend “in perpetuity.”72
Hopefully, legislative changes for North Dakota will be unnecessary and
North Dakota’s ninety-nine-year limitation on easements will be determined to be a negligible retained interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
North Dakota is currently left with uncertainty regarding whether or
not conservation easements can qualify for charitable deduction treatment.
That uncertainty can be eliminated through recognition that the value of any
remainder interest after a period of ninety-nine years is either negligible or
incidental.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
ALA. CODE § 35-18-2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811 (2005).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3811(d).
Id.
ALA. CODE § 35-18-2.
Id.

